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ABSTRACT
An error correcting code is said to be locally testable if there
is a test that checks whether a given string is a codeword, or
rather far from the code, by reading only a constant number
of symbols of the string. Locally Testable Codes (LTCs)
were ﬁrst systematically studied by Goldreich and Sudan
(J. ACM 53(4)) and since then several constructions of LTCs
have been suggested.
While the best known construction of LTCs by Ben-Sasson
and Sudan (STOC 2005) and Dinur (J. ACM 54(3)) achieves
very eﬃcient parameters, it relies heavily on algebraic tools
and on PCP machinery. In this work we present a new and
arguably simpler construction of LTCs that is purely combi-
natorial, does not rely on PCP machinery and matches the
parameters of the best known construction. However, un-
like the latter construction, our construction is not entirely
explicit.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
F[ Theory of Computation]: Miscellaneous
General Terms
Theory
1. INTRODUCTION
An error correcting code is said to be locally testable if
there is a test that checks whether a given string is a code-
word, or far from the code, by reading only a constant num-
ber of symbols of the string. Somewhat more precisely, a
code is locally testable if there exists an algorithm, called
the veriﬁer, that when given oracle access to a given string,
makes a constant number of queries to the oracle, accepts
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if the string is a codeword and rejects with high probabil-
ity if it is far from the code. Codes with related features
were implicitly constructed for the ﬁrst time as part of the
eﬀorts to prove the celebrated PCP theorem, but since then
the notion of locally testable codes has been recognized as
interesting by its own right (see, e.g., [13, 4, 6, 8]).
1.1 A general perspective
A PCP (Probabilistically Checkable Proof) is a proof that
allows checking the validity of a claim by reading only a
constant number of symbols of the proof. The PCP theorem
[3, 2] asserts the existence of PCPs of polynomial length for
any claim that can be stated as membership in an NP set.
The theorem has found many applications, most notably in
establishing lower bounds for approximation algorithms.
The discovery of PCPs of polynomial length, being re-
markable by its own right, raises the natural question of
how long should a proof be to enjoy local testability. Hav-
ing shorter locally testable proofs also aﬀects the various
applications of PCPs. This consideration motivates the di-
rect study of local testability, and the amount of redudancy
it requires. LTCs are a natural tool for such study.
One motivation for studying LTCs stems from the struc-
ture of most PCP constructions. Usually, a PCP system for
a given claim is constructed by encoding the proofs of the
claim using a special syntax. This syntax allows checking
t h a tas t r i n gi sav a l i dp r o o fu s i n gac o n s t a n tn u m b e ro f
queries, provided that the string follows that syntax.
In order for such syntax to be useful, it usually has to have
two additional properties: First, the veriﬁcation procedure
should be able to reject strings that are far from following
the syntax using only a constant number of queries. Sec-
ond, the syntax should have error-correction capabilities, in
order to allow the veriﬁcation procedure to function when it
is given access to strings that are close to following the syn-
tax, while not following it entirely. Locally Testable Codes
are the most simple objects that possess the both of those
properties, and we can therefore hope that a better under-
standing of LTCs will lead to better constructions of PCPs.
Furthermore, we expect constructions of LTCs to be much
simpler than constructions of PCPs, since LTCs are not re-
quired to allow proof checking.
Another motivation for the study of LTCs is that LTCs
can be viewed as the“combinatorial counterparts”of PCPs:
While PCPs are “complexity theoretic” objects that are lo-
cally testable, LTCs are combinatorial objects that are lo-
cally testable. Since combinatorial objects tend to be sim-
pler than complexity theoretic ones, we again may expectthe construction of LTCs to be simpler than the construc-
tion of PCPs.
Previous work. LTCs were ﬁrst systematically studied by
Goldreich and Sudan [13]. The construction of LTCs that
achieves the smallest amount of redudancy was given by
Ben-Sasson and Sudan [6]. Their construction yields a code
that encodes k bits of information into k · poly(logk)b i t s .
However, the veriﬁer of their construction only rejects strings
that are far from the code with probability of 1/poly(logk).
This limitation was waived later by Dinur [8] who, by ap-
plying her gap ampliﬁcation technique to the construction of
[6], improved the rejection probability to a constant, while
maintaining the block length of k·poly(logk). For a survey
of the previous constructions of LTCs, we refer the reader
to [11].
1.2 Our result
Our work was motivated by two considerations: The ﬁrst
consideration is concerned with the fact that the previous
constructions of LTCs either use PCPs as a building block,
or directly imply a construction of PCPs (e.g. [13, 6]). In
contrast, when taking the view of Section 1.1, one might
expect to have constructions of LTCs that are considerably
weaker than those of PCPs. Thus, we would have liked to
have a construction that does not rely on PCPs and further-
more does not directly give rise to constructions of PCPs.
The other consideration is concerned with the fact that
the previous constructions of LTCs are very algebraic. In
particular, the construction of [6] uses a very heavy alge-
braic machinery, even compared to the algebraic machinery
common in the PCP literature, and its analysis is quite com-
plicated. A simpler construction, of a combinatorial nature,
would have been preferred.
In this paper we give a construction that achieves both
the above goals: Our construction is purely combinatorial
and does not use PCPs as a building block. We also be-
lieve that it does not directly imply a construction of PCPs.
Our construction matches the parameters of the best known
construction of [6] and [8].
Explicitness. While our codes are not explicit in the usual
sense, we show that there is a probabilistic algorithm that
constructs, with overwhelming probability, the generating
matrix of our codes for inﬁnitely many message lengths.
We stress that even a completely non-explicit construc-
tion of LTCs that achieves good parameters would have been
valuable. The reason is that, unlike the case of many com-
binatorial objects (such as expander graphs and extractors),
a simple counting argument does not show the existence of
LTCs, regardless of the parameters. In this regard we men-
tion that Kaufman and Sudan [14] have recently showed that
random linear codes with very poor rate are locally testable,
while using a very sophisticated analysis. We also mention
that the construction of [13] achieves exactly the same no-
tion of explicitness as our construction.
1.3 Our techniques
Our construction consists of two main steps, which are
analogous to the constructions of [6] and [8]: In the ﬁrst
step we give a construction that achieves block length of
k · poly(logk), query complexity of poly(logk)a n dr e j e c -
tion probability of 1/poly(logk). In the second step we
reduce the query complexity to a constant and apply the
gap ampliﬁcation technique of [8] to amplify the rejection
probability to a constant. Below we give a rough sketch
of the techniques used in the ﬁrst step of our construction,
while the second step follows [8] quite closely.
Remark 1. In this section we make extensive use of coding
theory terminology. The reader is referred to Section 2.1 for
an overview of this terminology.
Codes with Proofs. We begin our construction by intro-
ducing the notion of “Code with Proof” (CWP), which was
implicit in some previous constructions ([13, 4, 6]). The
notion of CWP is a generalization of the notion of LTC in
which, in addition to the tested string, the veriﬁer is given
oracle access to a “proof string”. The proof string can be
thought as given by an untrusted prover that tries to con-
vince the veriﬁer to accept the string as a codeword. Intu-
itively, constructing a CWP should be easier than construct-
ing a LTC, because we can use the proof string in our favor,
while LTC can be seen as the special case of CWP where the
proof string is empty. A construction of a CWP with short
codewords and short proofs can then be transformed to a
short LTC with similar parameters using a known reduction
(see, e.g., [13, Sec. 5] and [4, Sec. 4.1]). Thus, we can focus
on constructing a CWP with good parameters.
We stress that, while the notion of CWP is closely related
to PCP, it does not undermine our goal of constructing LTCs
without PCP machinery. The crucial diﬀerence is that while
a general PCP system should be able to prove any NP-
claim, a CWP is only expected to prove the membership of
as t r i n gi nas p e c i ﬁ cc o d e .
We also note that the main step in the construction of [6]
is constructing PCPPs for Reed-Solomon codes, which can
be viewed as a special case of a CWP.
Aniterativeconstruction. Our construction is an iterative
one, and is similar in nature to the Zig-Zag construction of
expander graphs by Reingold et al. [17]. The starting point
of our construction is a code of small message length, which
is trivially a CWP. We then increase the message length of
this CWP iteratively. In every iteration, the parameters of
the CWP change as follows:
1. The message length is squared.
2 .T h er a t ea n dt h er e l a t i v ed i s t a n c eo ft h eC W Pr e m a i n
intact.
3. The ratio of the message length to the proof length of
the CWP decreases by a constant factor.
4. The query complexity of the veriﬁer increases by a con-
stant factor.
5. The rejection probability of the veriﬁer decreases by a
constant factor.
After O(loglogk) such iterations, we obtain a CWP of mes-
sage length k, rate Ω(1), relative distance Ω(1), proof length
k · poly(logk), query complexity poly(logk)a n dr e j e c t i o n
probability 1/poly(logk). Such a CWP translates into an
LTC that has the required parameters.
Thestructureofasingleiteration. A single iteration con-
sists of applying to the CWP three basic operations, each
aimed at improving or maintaing some other parameters of
the CWP. The ﬁrst basic operation is the tensor productof codes, which is used to square the message length of the
CWP. The problem with this operation is that it squares
the rate and relative distance of the CWP. In order to retain
the relative distance, we use a known distance ampliﬁcation
technique (see, e.g., [1]). The diﬃcult part is maintaining
the rate of the CWP.
In order to maintain the rate of the CWP, we use an oper-
ation called Random Projection, which consists of choosing
a random subset of the coordinates of the code and mov-
ing them from the codeword part to the proof string part.
This operation decreases the block length of the CWP at
the expense of increasing its proof length. The reason that
this operation is useful is that the tensor product operation
has a better eﬀect on the proof length of the CWP than on
its block length, and this eﬀect implies that it is beneﬁcial
to improve the block length at the expense of harming the
proof length. In particular, by using the random projection
operation, we are able to maintain the rate of the CWP
at each iteration, while decreasing the ratio of the message
length to the proof length of the CWP by merely a con-
stant factor. This interplay between the tensor product and
random projection operations is one of our main technical
contributions, and some additional ideas are used to make
it actually work (see Section 3.2).
By applying the three operations one after the other, we
get an iteration that has the required eﬀect on the parame-
ters of the CWP.
1.4 Organization of this paper
In Section 2, we review the notions of LTCs and CWPs
and state the results of this work formally. In Section 3,
we give a high-level overview of our construction. The full
details of our construction are provided in the full version of
this work [15].
2. PRELIMINARIES
For any n ∈ N,w ed e n o t e[ n]
def = {1,...,n}.G i v e n a n y
string x over any alphabet, we denote its i-th symbol by
xi. For any string x of length n and for any set S ⊆ [n]o f
indices i1 <i 2 <...<i |S| we denote by x|S the projection
of x to S,t h a ti s ,x|S
def = xi1xi2 ...x is.
2.1 Error Correcting Codes
Let Σ be a ﬁnite alphabet. A code C is a one-to-one
function from Σ
k to Σ
n,w h e r ek and n are called the code’s
message length and block length, respectively. The rate of
the code is deﬁned to be RC
def =
k
n. We will sometimes
identify C with its image C(Σ
k). Speciﬁcally, we will write
c ∈ C to indicate the fact that there exists x ∈ Σ
k such that
c = C(x). In such case, we also say that c is a codeword of
C.
For any two strings x,y ∈ Σ
n,t h erelative Hamming dis-
tance between x and y is the fraction of coordinates on which
they diﬀer, and is denoted by δ(x,y)
def = |{xi  = yi : i ∈ [n]}|/n.
The relative distance of a code C is the minimal relative dis-
tance between two diﬀerent codewords of C, and is denoted
by δC
def =m i n c1 =c2∈C {δ(c1,c 2)}.F o r a s t r i n g x ∈ Σ
n,w e
denote by δC(x) the minimal relative distance from x to the
nearest codeword of C,t h a ti s ,δC(x)
def =m i n c∈C δ(x,c). If
as t r i n gx satisﬁes δC(x) ≤ τ, we say that it is τ-close to C,
otherwise we say that it is τ-far from C.
Codes with different message and codewordalphabets.
It is also possible to deﬁne codes that encode strings over
one alphabet to strings over another alphabet. All of the
above deﬁnitions carry through, except for the rate of the
code, which is deﬁned as follows: Let Σ and Γ denote ﬁnite
alphabets, and let C :Σ
k → Γ
n denote a code. Then the
rate of C is deﬁned to be RC
def =
k log|Σ|
nlog|Γ|.
Inﬁnite families of codes. An inﬁnite family of codes C =
{Ck} is a sequence of codes such that the code Ck has mes-
sage length k. The block length n(k), rate R(k)a n dr e l a t i v e
distance δ(k) of such a family are functions of k such that Ck
has block length n(k), rate R(k) and relative distance δ(k).
Throughout this paper we often work with inﬁnite families
of codes, and refer them simply as“codes”. For example, we
say that a code C has block length k
2 a n dm e a nt h a tf o r
every k, the code Ck in the family C has block length k
2.
2.1.1 Linear codes
Suppose that Σ = F for some ﬁnite ﬁeld F.I ns u c hc a s e
we say that C : F
k → F
n is a linear code if C is a linear
function.
Suppose that C : F
k → F
n is a linear code. Then C
￿
F
k
￿
is a linear subspace of F
n, and thus for every two codewords
c1,c 2 ∈ C and scalars a,b ∈ F,t h ev e c t o ra·c1 +b·c2 is also
a codeword. Furthermore, there exists a k × n matrix G,
called the generating matrix of C, that satisﬁes C(x)=x ·G
for every row vector x ∈ F
k.
For any string x ∈ F
n,t h eweight of x is the fraction
of non-zero coordinates of x, and is denoted by wt(x)
def =
δ(x,0). Two immediate conclusions of the foregoing facts
are that if C is a linear code, then the zero vector is a
codeword of C,a n dt h er e l a t i v ed i s t a n c eo fC is equal to
min0 =c∈C {wt(c)}.
Consider now the case where C is a code over the alphabet
F
t for some natural number t.W es a yt h a tC is an F-linear
code if for every two strings x,y ∈
￿
F
t
￿k and scalars a,b ∈ F
it holds that C(a · x + b · y)=a · C(x)+b · C(y), where
the scalar multiplication is deﬁned by viewing x,y,C(x)a n d
C(y)a sv e c t o r si nF
kt and F
nt. Note that a code that is
linear over F
t is necessarily F-linear, but the converse does
not necessarily hold.
2.1.2 Concatenation of codes
We turn to describe the code concatenation technique,
which is commonly used in Coding Theory for reducing the
alphabet size of codes. Let Σ and Γ denote ﬁnite alphabets,
where we think of Γ as being much larger than Σ. Let C1 :
Σ
k → Γ
n and C2 :Γ→ Σ
  denote codes. The concatenation
of C1 and C2, denoted C1   C2 :Σ
k → Σ
n , is deﬁned as
follows: To encode a message x ∈ Σ
k with C1   C2,i ti s
ﬁrst encoded by C1, and then every symbol of the result is
encoded by C2. Formally, we deﬁne
C1   C2(x)
def = C2
￿
C1 (x)1
￿
C2
￿
C1 (x)2
￿
...C 2
￿
C1 (x)n
￿
We refer to C1 as the outer code and to C2 as the inner code.
It is not hard to see that RC1 C2 = RC1 · RC2 and that
δC1 C2 = δC1 · δC2.F u r t h e r m o r e , i f C1 : F
k →
￿
F
t
￿n is an
F-linear code and C2 : F
t → F
s is a linear code then their
concatenation C1   C2 is a linear code over F.2.2 Non-standard issues regarding codes
For the rest of this paper, let F denote some large ﬁnite
ﬁeld of some ﬁxed size (say, |F| = 64). Unless stated explic-
itly otherwise, all our codes will be over the alphabet F,a n d
will also be linear codes. The reason for using codes over F,
rather than binary codes, is that one of the theorems we use
requires the codes to have a very large relative distance (i.e.,
slightly more than
4
￿
7/8 ≈ 0.967), and such large relative
distance can only be achieved using a large enough alphabet.
For any code C : F
k → F
n and a set S ⊆ [n]w ed e n o t eb y
C|S : F
k → F
|S| the projection of the code C to the coordi-
nates in S. Note that the function C|S is not necessarily a
code, since it is not necessarily one to one.
2.3 Probabilistic Circuits
A probabilistic circuit that tosses r coins is a circuit that
is given, in addition to its input, a string of r bits that is
chosen uniformly at random. The additional random string
is referred as the coin tosses of the circuit, and the output
of the circuit is a distribution over its coin tosses.
In this paper we use probabilistic oracle circuits. Note
that the use of probabilistic circuits is not common, since a
probabilistic circuit can usually be transformed into a deter-
ministic circuit. However, we are interested in probabilistic
oracle circuits that make very few queries to their oracle,
and these have no deterministic counterparts.
2.4 Locally Testable Codes
A code is locally testable if it is possible to test whether a
given string is a codeword, or far from being a codeword, by
reading only a small number of its symbols. We now give a
formal and quantative deﬁnition of this intuitive notion.
Deﬁnition 1. Ac o d eC : F
k → F
n is said to be (q,τ,ε)-
Locally Testable if there exists a probabilistic oracle circuit
V that satisﬁes the following requirements:
1. The oracle is a string over F.
2. V makes at most q non-adaptive queries to its oracle.
3. For every codeword c ∈ C, it holds that Pr[V
c accepts] =
1.
4. For every string w ∈ F
n that is τ-far from C,i th o l d s
that Pr[V
w rejects] ≥ ε.
The circuit V is called the veriﬁer of C, the parameter q is
called the query complexity of C, the parameter τ is called
the distance threshold of C and the parameter ε is called the
rejection probability of C.
Remark 2. The common deﬁnition of LTCs uses Turing
machines instead of circuits. We chose to use a more general
deﬁnition that allows circuits in order to handle the case
where the code C is not explicit.
Our result can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1. There exists an inﬁnite family of locally testable
codes {Ck}k such that Ck has message length k, block length
k·poly(logk), relative distance Ω(1),q u e r yc o m p l e x i t yO(1),
arbitrarily small constant distance threshold τ>0,a n dr e -
jection probability Ω(1). Furthermore, the codes in the fam-
ily are linear and there exists a probabilistic algorithm that
on input k,r u n si nt i m epoly(k) and outputs with probabil-
ity 1−exp(−poly(logk)) the generating matrix and veriﬁer
circuit of Ck.
The codes of Theorem 1 are over the alphabet F. Using con-
catenation with any binary code, one can get binary LTCs
with roughly the same parameters. In particular, since F is
of constant size, the concatenation will increase the query
complexity of the code only by a constant factor. If one
wants to get linear binary LTCs, he only needs to choose F
to be an extension ﬁeld of GF(2).
2.5 Codes with Proofs
We introduce the non-standard notion of“Code With Proof”
(CWP). Intuitively, a CWP is a generalization of LTC, in
which the veriﬁer is given, in addition to oracle access to the
tested string, an oracle access to a “proof string”, which is
supposed to “prove” that the tested string is indeed a code-
word. Formally, a CWP is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2. Ac o d eC : F
k → F
n is said to be a (q,ε,m)-
Code With Proof (CWP) if there exists a probabilsitic oracle
circuit V that satisﬁes the following requirements:
1 .T h eo r a c l ei sas t r i n go v e rF.
2. V makes at most q non-adaptive queries to its oracle.
3. For every codeword c ∈ C there exists a string πc ∈ F
m
such that Pr[V
c,πc accepts] = 1. We refer to πc as a
proof string of c with respect to V .
4. For every string w ∈ F
n and every string π ∈ F
m,w e
have that Pr[V
w,π rejects] ≥ ε · δC(w). We refer to w
as the “tested string” and to π as the “proof string”.
The circuit V is called the veriﬁer of C, the parameter q is
called the query complexity of C, the parameter ε is called
the rejection ratio of C, and the parameter m is called the
proof length. We deﬁne the proof rate of C to be the ratio
k/m. We will sometimes refer to the rate of C as the code
rate, in order to distinguish it from the proof rate.
A strongersoundnessrequirement. Note that the sound-
ness requirement of CWPs (Deﬁnition 2, Requirement 4) is
stronger than the corresponding requirement of LTCs (De-
ﬁnition 1, Requirement 4). In particular, the deﬁnition of
LTCs requires the veriﬁer to reject only strings that are far
from the code, while the deﬁnition of CWPs requires the
veriﬁer to reject any non-codeword with adequate probabil-
ity. This diﬀerence between the soundness requirements is
an artifact of the transformation of CWPs to LTCs, which
losses the stronger soundness property.
CWPs imply LTCs. Every CWP of block length n and
proof length m can be transformed to a LTC of block length
O(n + m) using a known reduction (see Appendix A for
more details). Thus, we construct the LTCs of Theorem 1
by constructing the following CWPs:
Theorem 2. There exists an inﬁnite family of CWPs {Ck}k
such that Ck has message length k, block length O(k),r e l -
ative distance Ω(1),q u e r yc o m p l e x i t yO(1), rejection ratio
Ω(1) and proof length k·poly(logk). Furthermore, the codes
in the family are linear and there exists a probabilistic algo-
rithm that on input k,r u n si nt i m epoly(k) and outputs with
probability 1−exp(−poly(logk)) the generating matrix and
veriﬁer circuit of Ck.CWPsandPCPPs. A reader who is familiar with the PCP
literature will note that the notion of CWP is a special case
of the notion of PCP of Proximity (PCPP), introduced in
[4] and [9]. Speciﬁcally, CWPs are good codes coupled with
PCPPs that are able to prove membership in those codes.
In constrast, in the PCP literature one usually constructs
PCPPs for NP-complete sets. Hence, CWPs are weaker
than the PCPPs that are usually constructed, which cor-
responds with our goal of constructing LTCs without PCP
machinery.
3. HIGH-LEVEL OVERVIEW
In this section, we give a high-level overview of our main
construction. This construction yields CWPs that almost
achieve the parameters of Theorem 2, but have query com-
plexity poly(log k) and rejection ratio 1/poly(logk). In or-
der to obtain CWPs of constant query complexity and con-
stant rejection ratio, as stated in Theorem 2, we apply a
known query reduction technique and the gap ampliﬁcation
technique of Dinur [8] (see the full version of this paper [15,
Sec. 6] for details). We then transform the latter CWPs to
LTCs with good parameters using a standard transforma-
tion (see Appendix A). Table 1 summarizes the parameters
of the CWPs that we construct in this section.
Parameter name Parameter value
Message length k
Rate Ω(1)
Relative distance Ω(1)
Proof rate 1/poly(logk)
Query complexity poly(logk)
Rejection ratio 1/poly(logk)
Table 1: The parameters of the main construction
of CWPs
In Section 3.1, we describe a simpliﬁed construction of
CWPs that has the required parameters and works under
some simplifying assumption. In Section 3.2, we show how
to remove the simplifying assumption and describe the full
construction.
3.1 A simpliﬁed construction of CWPs with
good parameters
Our construction works by starting from a code of small
message length, which is trivially a CWP, and gradually in-
creasing its message length. Speciﬁcally, we design a trans-
formation that transforms a CWP C i n t oaC W PC
  with
the following eﬀect on the parameters:
Parameter name C C
 
Message length k k
2
Rate R R
Relative distance δ δ
Proof rate P γ · P for a constant γ<1
Query complexity q β · q for a constant β>1
Rejection ratio ε α · ε for a constant α<1
Table 2: The eﬀect of a single iteration
Having designed a transformation as stated in Table 2,
we construct CWPs with the parameters stated in Table 1
by starting with a trivial CWP of constant message length
and iteratively applying the transformation for O (loglogk)
iterations. The transformation consists of three basic oper-
ations:
1. Tensor Product - In order to increase the message
length, we use the tensor product operation. This op-
eration squares the message length, but also squares
the rate and the relative distance. See Section 3.1.1
for details.
2. Random Projection - This operation increases the rate.
See Section 3.1.2 for details.
3. Distance Ampliﬁcation - This operation increases the
relative distance. See Section 3.1.3 for details.
By applying the basic operations one after the other, we
obtain the transformation stated in Table 2. In the rest of
this subsection, we describe each of the operations in detail.
3.1.1 Tensor product of CWPs
Given a code C of message length k and block length n,
the tensor product of C with itself, denoted C
2,i sac o d e
of message length k
2 and block length n
2 deﬁned as follows.
To encode a message x ∈ F
k2
,v i e w e da sak × k matrix, we
ﬁrst encode every row of x with C.L e t y be the resulting
k × n matrix. We then encode every column of y with C,
and deﬁne the resulting n×n matrix to be C
2(x). Note that
if C has rate R,t h e nC
2 has rate R
2.I ti sa l s oe a s yt op r o v e
that if C has relative distance δ then the relative distance
of C
2 is δ
2 (see [18, Lecture 6]).
The tensor product is one of the simplest ways to obtain
a code of large message length from a code of small message
length. We would like to use tensor product to increase the
message length of our CWPs. In order to do so, we need to
show that if C is a CWP, then C
2 is a CWP with related
parameters.
One can show, using the linearity of C, that the codewords
of C
2 are exactly the n × n matrices all of whose rows and
columns are codewords of C (see [18, Lecture 6]). If C is a
CWP, then this fact suggests the following natural veriﬁer
for C
2:G i v e n a n n × n matrix to be tested, the veriﬁer
chooses either a random row or a column of the matrix, and
invokes the veriﬁer of C to test whether this row/column
is a codeword of C. Note that in order to implement this
idea, we need to provide the veriﬁer of C
2 with the proof
strings that prove that each row and column of the matrix
are codewords of C.
We thus deﬁne the veriﬁer of C
2 as follows: Given oracle
access to a tested string w and a proof string π, the veriﬁer of
C
2 views w as an n×n matrix and interprets π as a collection
of strings π1,...,π 2n such that every string πi corresponds
to some row or column of w. The veriﬁer of C
2 then chooses
a random row/column and emulates the veriﬁer of C with
oracle access to this row/column and to its corresponding
proof string πi. The veriﬁer of C
2 accepts if and only if the
veriﬁer of C accepts.
Does this natural veriﬁer “work”? It turns out that while
in some important cases the answer is “yes”(see [16, 10]), in
the general case, the answer is “no” (see [19, 7, 12]). How-
ever, in this subsection we assume that that the answer is
“yes” also in the general case. Speciﬁcally, we assume the
following:
Simplifying Assumption for CWPs:. There exists a con-
stant α ≤ 1 such that given a (q,ε,m)-CWP C : F
k → F
n,the code C
2 is a (q,α · ε,2n · m)-CWP with respect to the
veriﬁer and proof strings described above.
Note the eﬀect of the tensor product on the proof rate.
Speciﬁcally, if C has proof rate P,t h e nC
2 has proof rate
1
2 · R · P. A crucial point now becomes visible - the tensor
product does not square P, but rather multiplies it by R.
3.1.2 Random Projection
We now describe the random projection operation, which
w eu s et oi m p r o v et h er a t eo ft h eC W P s .L e tC : F
k → F
n
be a CWP. The most straightforward way to increase the
rate of C is to project C t oas u b s e tS ⊆ [n]. This poses two
problems:
1. The function C|S does not necessarily have a good rel-
ative distance. Moreover, C|S may not be one-to-one.
2. The function C|S may not be a CWP. In particular, we
can no longer use the veriﬁer of C,b e c a u s et h i sv e r i ﬁ e r
may query one of the coordinates that were projected
out.
The ﬁrst issue is solved by choosing the subset S ⊆ [n] uni-
formly at random.I tc a nb es h o w nt h a ti fS is a suﬃciently
large random set, then with high probability the function
C|S is a code that maintains the relative distance of C up to
a constant factor. The second issue is solved by providing
the veriﬁer of C with the“missing coordinates” in the proof
string. That is, for every c ∈ C, we deﬁne the proof string
of the codeword c|S ∈ C|S to contain c|[n]\S in addition to
the proof string of c. We refer to the operation of choosing
a random subset of the coordinates, projecting the code to
this subset, and moving the other coordinates to the proof
part as Random Projection.
At ﬁrst look, including the missing coordinates in the
proof part seems weird. Our goal in projecting out those
coordinates was reducing the redudancy of C.I f w e j u s t
move those coordinates from the codeword part to the proof
part, it seems that we do not gain anything in terms of re-
dundancy.
One of the most important observations of this work is
that decreasing the block length of a CWP at the expense
of increasing its proof length is beneﬁcial. The reason is that
while the tensor product operation squares the block length,
it only multiplies the proof length by a factor that depends
on the block length. Thus, decreasing the block length of a
CWP C improves the proof length of C
2.T h i se ﬀ e c tt u r n s
out to be very signiﬁcant, and therefore moving coordinates
from the codeword part to the proof part, while not giving
an “immediate” gain in the redundancy (in C), is beneﬁcial
in the “long run” (in C
2).
To see it, suppose that a single iteration of our construc-
tion consisted of applying a tensor product to the CWP, and
then applying random projection to the CWP to increase
its code rate back to what it was before the tensor product.
Consider the eﬀect of applying such iterations to a CWP of
code rate R and proof rate P. Assume that P ≤ R, and note
that in such case the random projection decreases the proof
rate by a factor of at most 2. After the ﬁrst iteration, the
CWP will have code rate R and proof rate
1
4 ·R·P,b e c a u s e
the tensor product multiplies the proof rate by
1
2 ·R and the
random projection multiplies the proof rate by
1
2 (since we
assume P ≤ R). After the second iteration, the CWP will
have code rate R and proof rate
￿
1
4 · R
￿2·P. In general, after
i iterations the CWP will have code rate R and proof rate
￿
1
4 · R
￿i · P. It is now easy to see the beneﬁt of the random
projection: Had our iteration consisted only of tensor prod-
uct, then after i iterations the CWP would have had code
rate of R
2i
. We conclude that, by using random projection
to maintain the code rate the same in all iterations, we can
make the proof rate decrease by only a constant factor in
each iteration, as stated in Table 2.
Remark 3. Note that the random projection operation
has a certain error probability. Speciﬁcally, if the random
projection is applied to a CWP C of message length k,t h e n
with probability exp(−Ω(k)) over the choice of the set S,
the function C|S is not guaranteed to be one-to-one, or to
have a good relative distance.
3.1.3 Distance Ampliﬁcation
We turn to describe the distance ampliﬁcation operation,
which we use to improve the relative distance of the CWPs.
Speciﬁcally, we present a distance ampliﬁcation procedure
that can increase the relative distance of a code from any
constant to any constant that is smaller than
|F|−1
|F| , while
decreasing the rate by only a constant factor. We comment
that similiar distance ampliﬁcation procedures are known in
coding theory literature for quite some time (see, e.g., [1]).
Our contribution is merely observing that these procedures
preserve local testability.
Let C : F
k → F
n be a code with relative distance δ.W e
wish to improve the relative distance of C while not de-
creasing its rate by too much. In order to do so, we take the
following view on the relative distance of C: Consider the
“experiment”that given a non-zero codeword c ∈ C,c h o o s e s
a random coordinate i ∈ [n] and“succeeds”if ci is non-zero.
Since the relative distance of C is the minimal weight of a
non-zero codeword of C, the probability that the above ex-
periment succeeds is δ. Furthermore, the experiment tosses
only log n coins.
Observe that improving the relative distance of C while
incuring only a small loss to the rate of C is analogous to
increasing the success probability of the above experiment
while not tossing too many additional coins. One possible
way of improving the success probability in a randomness
eﬃcient manner is taking random walks on expander graph.
Let G be a d-regular expander on n vertices with relative
second eigenvalue λ. We identify the vertices of G with the
coordinates of c. The probability that a random walk of
length t of G hits a coordinate i such that ci  = 0 is at least
1 − (1 − δ + λ)
t. Furthermore, such a random walk tosses
only log n + tlog d coins.
We adapt the above method to the problem of improv-
ing the relative distance of C. Deﬁne a code C
  : F
k →
￿
F
t+1
￿dtn as follows (Note that the codewords of C
  are over
the alphabet F
t+1): Let x ∈ F
k be a message. We identify
every coordinate of C(x)w i t hav e r t e xo fG and every co-
ordinate of C
 (x) with a walk of length t on G.N o w , f o r
every walk (i0,...,i t) ∈ [n]
t of length t on G we deﬁne the
coordinate of C
 (x) that corresponds to (i0,...,i t)t ob e
C
 (x)(i0,...,it)
def =
￿
C(x)i0,...,C(x)it
￿
∈ F
t+1 (1)
B yt h ed i s c u s s i o na b o v e ,t h er e l a t i v ed i s t a n c eo fC
  is at
least 1 − (1 − δ + λ)
t. We ﬁnish the distance ampliﬁcation
procedure with reducing the alphabet of C
  back to F byconcatenating C
  with some good inner code over the al-
phabet F.L e t D i s t A m p ( C) denote the result of the con-
catenation. By choosing t to be a suﬃciently large constant
and by choosing an inner code of suﬃciently large relative
distance, we can amplify the relative distance of C to any
constant less than
|F|−1
|F| , while decreasing the rate of C only
by a constant factor which depends on t and on the inner
code.
The local testability of DistAmp(C). In order to use the
distance ampliﬁcation procedure, we need to show that if C
is a CWP then so is DistAmp(C). We sketch the argument
below.
Assume that C is a CWP. We begin by observing that C
 
is a CWP: The reason is that the transformation from C(x)
to C
 (x)t h a tw a sd e s c r i b e di nE q u a t i o n1c a nb ev i e w e da s
applying a certain repetition code to c.T h u s ,v e r i f y i n gt h a t
as t r i n gi sac o d e w o r do fC
  amounts to testing a repetition
code and emulating the veriﬁer of C.
Now, to show that DistAmp(C)i saC W P ,o b s e r v et h a t
a veriﬁer for DistAmp(C) can emulate the veriﬁer of C
  as
follows: Whenever the veriﬁer of C
  queries a coordinate i,
the veriﬁer of DistAmp(C) reads the supposed encoding of
the coordinate i, checks that it is a legal codeword of the
inner code, and uses it to answer the query of the veriﬁer of
C
 .
Note that the veriﬁer of DistAmp(C)u s e sm o r eq u e r i e s
than the veriﬁer of C. Speciﬁcally, every time we apply dis-
tance ampliﬁcation to a CWP, its query complexity increases
by a constrant factor. However, we can aﬀord this increase,
since it still matches the parameters stated in Table 2.
Remark 4. The distance ampliﬁcation procedure described
above is only one way out of many to improve the relative
distance of a code. A similiar way was described in [1], who
used neighbourhoods of vertices in a bipartite expander in-
stead of random walks on a non-bipartite expander. Fur-
thermore, as explained above, the intuition of the distance
ampliﬁcation comes from amplifying hitting probabilities,
and therefore any randomness eﬃcient hitter can be used for
distance ampliﬁcation. For example, one could take neigh-
bourhoods of vertices in a disperser instead of a bipartite
expander.
3.1.4 The construction so far
Using the ideas described in this subsection, we can now
present a simpliﬁed construction of CWPs with good para-
meters. Suppose we wish to construct a CWP with message
length k,r a t eR and relative distance δ.F o rs o m ec o n s t a n t
k0,l e tC0 : F
k0 → F
n0 be a code, and note that C0 is triv-
ially a CWP with query complexity n0, rejection ratio 1 and
proof length 0. We deﬁne a sequence of CWPs {Ci}i,w h e r e
the CWP Ci+1 is obtained from from Ci as follows:
1. Apply tensor product to Ci and deﬁne CTP
i to be C
2
i .
2. Apply random projection to CTP
i to improve its rate
to R.L e tCRP
i denote the result.
3. Apply distance ampliﬁcation to CRP
i to improve its
relative distance back to δ.S e tCi+1 to be the result.
It is not hard to see that Clog logk0 k has message length k,
proof rate and rejection ratio 1/poly(logk), query complex-
ity poly(log k), constant rate and constant relative distance,
as stated in Table 1.
3.2 Removing the simplifying assumption
A crucial issue, of course, is removing the simplifying as-
sumption (of Section 3.1.1). Recall that this assumption is
that for every CWP C, the code C
2 is a CWP with related
parameters. This assumption is not true in general. How-
ever, we can use a special case (presented in [5]) for which
the assumption is true in order to make our construction
work. The result of [5] says, roughly, that if a CWP C is
of the form C = C
2
s for some code Cs,t h e nC
2 is a CWP
with related parameters (Note that Cs is not necessarily a
CWP). We note that the result of [5] uses a slightly more
sophisticated veriﬁer for C
2 than the row/column veriﬁer
we used before. We describe this veriﬁer in more detail in
Section 3.3.
We say that a code C is of a square form if there exists
ac o d eCs such that C = C
2
s. In order to use the result
of [5], we need to make sure that every CWP to which we
apply tensor product is of a square form. To do so, we
will maintain this form as an invariant throughout the it-
erations of our construction: We will start with an initial
CWP that is of a square form, and then show that every
iteration preserves the square form. In order to show that
a single iteration preserves the square form, we will need to
modify the random projection and distance ampliﬁcation op-
erations such that they preserve the square form (while the
tensor product trivially preserves the square form). In Sec-
tion 3.3.1, we describe the required modiﬁcation of the ran-
dom projection and the distance ampliﬁcation operations.
Remark 5. The result of [5] only holds if Cs has a suﬃ-
ciently large relative distance (i.e., greater than
4
￿
7
8). Thus,
we will have to make sure that the relative distance of Cs
is that large. Such relative distance can be achieved using
the distance amplﬁciation. The need to have codes of such
high relative distance is the reason why we need to work
with codes over some suﬃciently large ﬁnite ﬁeld F instead
of binary codes.
3.3 The Axis Parallel Planes Test
In this subsection, we describe the veriﬁer of [5] that is
used in Section 3.2. Let Cs be a code with block length ns,
and let C = C
2
s be a CWP with block length n = n
2
s.R e c a l l
that the codewords of C
2 are the matrices such that each of
t h e i rr o w sa n dc o l u m n si sac o d e w o r do fC.W e n o w v i e w
the code C
2 as follows: C
2 has block length n
4
s,a n dw ev i e w
the strings of length n
4
s as 4-dimensional hypercubes with
coordinates in [ns]
4. Taking this view, one can show that
as t r i n gw ∈ F
n4
s is a codeword of C
2 if and only if every
restriction of w to an axis parallel plane of the hypercube is
ac o d e w o r do fC (see Section 4.1 in the full version of this
work [15] for details).
The latter characterization of the codewords of C
2 sug-
gests the following “planes veriﬁer” for C
2: Given a tested
string w, the veriﬁer views w as a 4-dimensional hypercube,
chooses a random axis parallel plane of w and veriﬁes that
it is a codeword of C (by emulating the veriﬁer of C). It
turns out that this veriﬁer works well. Using a result of [5],
we show that if C is a CWP with rejection ratio ε,t h e nC
2
with the planes veriﬁer is a CWP with rejection ratio 2
−32·ε
(see [15, Section 4.2] for details). Note that in order for the
“planes veriﬁer” to work, it needs to be given access to the
proof strings of all the axis parallel planes. Thus, the proof
string of a codeword c of C
2 will consist of the proof stringsthat prove that each axis parallel plane of c is a codeword of
C.I tc a nb es h o w nt h a ti fC has block length n = n
2
s and
proof length m,t h e nC
2 has proof length
￿4
2
￿
·n·m =6 ·n·m,
rather than 2 · n · m as in Section 3.1.1. However, the extra
factor of 3 is immaterial.
3.3.1 Preserving the Square Form
In this subsection we describe how we modify the random
projection and distance ampliﬁcation operations such that
they preserve the square form of the CWP. Let us focus for
now on the random projection operation. Let C : F
k → F
n
be a CWP of a square form, that is, C = C
2
s for some code
Cs : F
ks → F
ns. Suppose we want to improve the rate of
C.I f w e p r o j e c t C to some random subset of coordinates
S ⊆ [n], it is unlikely that that C|S will be of a square form,
since the probability that the subset S will have the form of
as q u a r ei sv e r yl o w .
The solution to the problem is to apply random projection
to Cs instead of C. That is, in order to improve the rate of
C,w ec h o o s eas e tT ⊆ [ns] uniformly at random and take
￿
Cs|T
￿2 to be our new CWP. Clearly,
￿
Cs|T
￿2 is of a square
form and has a better rate than C = C
2
s.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
￿
Cs|T
￿2 is indeed a CWP, since
￿
Cs|T
￿2 = C|T×T.
We use the same solution for the distance ampliﬁcation
operation: In order to improve the relative distance of C,
we take (DistAmp(Cs))
2 to be our new CWP. The code
(DistAmp(Cs))
2 is of a square form and has a better rela-
tive distance than C. However, it is not clear why should
(DistAmp(Cs))
2 be a CWP. The way of showing that
(DistAmp(Cs))
2 is a CWP is another novelty of this paper.
We begin by observing that applying distance ampliﬁca-
tion to a codeword of Cs is a linear operation - that is, there
is a linear function A such that for every message xs ∈ F
ks
it holds that A(Cs(xs)) = (DistAmp(Cs))(xs). We proceed
by viewing (DistAmp(Cs))
2 as follows. In order to encode
a message x ∈ F
k with (DistAmp(Cs))
2,v i e wx as ks × ks
matrix and perform the following steps:
1. Encode every row of x with Cs.D e n o t et h er e s u l tb y
x
1.
2. Apply A to every row of x
1.D e n o t et h er e s u l tb yx
2.
3. Encode every column of x
2 with Cs.D e n o t et h er e s u l t
by x
3.
4. Apply A to every column of x
3. Set (DistAmp(Cs))
2 (x)
to be the result.
We claim that using the linearity of Cs and A,w ec a ns w i t c h
the order of Steps 2 and 3. After switching the order, the
encoding procedure of (DistAmp(Cs))
2 becomes:
1. Encode x with C = C
2
s.D e n o t et h er e s u l tb yx
1.
2. Apply A to every row of x
1.D e n o t et h er e s u l tb yx
2.
3. Apply A to every column of x
2. Set (DistAmp(Cs))
2 (x)
to be the result.
Thus, (DistAmp(Cs))
2 (x) is obtained by applying A many
times to parts of C(x). We next show that a veriﬁer of
(DistAmp(Cs))
2 can test a candidate codeword by emulat-
ing the veriﬁer of C. While we could prove the latter claim
directly, such a proof would have been quite complicated.
Instead, we develop a general framework that allows us to
give a cleaner formulation of this argument.
Ageneralframework. In order to prove that (DistAmp(Cs))
2
is a CWP, we develop a general framework for proving such
claims. This framework allows us to give a simple and ele-
gant proof of the argument sketched in this subsection, and
may be of independent interest. We ﬁrst deﬁne the compo-
sition of two codes to be the composition of their encoding
functions, and deﬁne a non-standard notion of “repetition
codes”. We then examine the structure of (DistAmp(Cs))
2
and observe that it can be obtained by composing C with
repetition codes and permuting its coordinates. Next, we
identify some simple properties such that composing a code
having those properties with a CWP yields a CWP. Finally,
we show that repetition codes have the aforementioned prop-
erties and conclude that (DistAmp(Cs))
2 is a CWP. For
more details regarding those framework and proof, see the
full version of this work [15, Sec. 5]
For a simple example of how a code can be obtained using
repetitions and permutations, consider the code C
  of Sec-
tion 3.1.3 (see Equation 1), and view its codewords as strings
over the alphabet F (rather than F
t+1). Observe that the
codewords of C
  can be obtained by duplicating the symbols
of the codewords of C and permuting their coordinates. Al-
though the latter example may seem trivial, the framework
we develop in this work allows expressing more complicated
codes (e.g., DistAmp(C)a n dC
2) as results of composing C
with repetition codes.
3.3.2 The full construction
We now review the full construction. Suppose we wish to
construct a CWP of message length k.F o r s o m e c o n s t a n t
k0,l e tC0 : F
k0 → F
n0 be a code with rate R and relative
distance δ. We start by viewing the code C
2
0 as a trivial
CWP with query complexity n
2
0, rejection ratio 1 and proof
length 0. We next deﬁne a sequence of codes {Ci}i,s u c h
that each C
2
i is a CWP. In other words, we think of the i-th
iteration as starting with the CWP C
2
i and producing the
CWP C
2
i+1. The code Ci+1 is obtained from Ci as follows:
1. Let CTP
i
def = C
2
i . Observe that the code CTP
i is of a
square form, and therefore the code
￿
CTP
i
￿2
is a CWP
by a theorem of [5] (see Appendix 3.3 for details).
2. Let CRP
i be the result of applying random projection
to CTP
i . The code
￿
CRP
i
￿2
is a CWP since
￿
CTP
i
￿2
is a CWP (see discussion at the begining of Section
3.3.1).
3. Set Ci+1 to be the result of applying distance am-
pliﬁcation to CRP
i . The code C
2
i+1 is a CWP since
￿
CRP
i
￿2
is a CWP (see Section 3.3.1).
We now have that
￿
Clog logk0 k−1
￿2
is a CWP with message
length k and with the parameters stated in Table 1.
There is one more issue that needs to be handled. Recall
that the random projection operation has error probabil-
ity of exp(−Ω(k)). Thus, the construction outlined above
has error probability of at least exp
￿
−Ω
￿
k
2
0
￿
￿
,w h i c hi sa
constant. In order to achieve error probability of at most
exp(−poly(logk)) (as stated in Theorem 2), we choose k0
to be poly(logk) instead of a constant. This choice in-
creases the query complexity the ﬁnal CWP by a factor of
poly(logk), which we can aﬀord.Acknowledgement. The author would like to thank his ad-
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APPENDIX
A. FROM CWPS TO LTCS
In this appendix we describe how our CWPs can be trans-
formed into LTCs. Since we want our LTCs to be linear,w e
ﬁrst need to deﬁne another property of CWPs.
Deﬁnition 3. AC W PC : F
k → F
n with proof length m
and veriﬁer V is said to have linear proofs if and only if there
exists a k × m matrix P such that for every x ∈ F
k it holds
that x · P is a proof string of C(x). We refer to P as the
proof matrix of C.
It can be shown that the CWPs we construct in Theorem 2
have linear proofs. Furtheremore, the algorithm of Theorem
2 can be modiﬁed to output the proof matrix of the CWP,
in addition to its generating matrix and veriﬁer. We can
therefore derive the LTCs of Theorem 1 by applying the
following theorem to the CWPs of Theorem 2. We mention
that the following theorem is implicit in prior works (see,
e.g., [13, Sec. 5] and [4, Sec. 4.1]).
Theorem 3. Let C : F
k → F
n be a (q,ε,m)-CWP with
relative distance δ,a n dl e tτ>0 be an arbitrarily small con-
stant. Then there exists locally testable code C
  with mes-
sage length k, block length O(n+m), relative distance Ω(δ),
query complexity max{q,2}, distance threshold τ and rejec-
tion probability Ω(ε), where the constants in the Big-O/Ω
notation depend on τ.F u r t h e r m o r e ,i f C has linear proofs
then C
  is linear, and there exists a polynomial time algo-
rithm that given the generaring matrix, veriﬁer circuit and
proof matrix of C, outputs the generating matrix and veriﬁer
circuit of C
 .
Proof Idea. The most straightforward way to construct C
 
from C is deﬁning C
 (x)=C(x)πC(x), for every message
x ∈ F
k,w h e r eπC(x) is a proof string of C(x). However, if
the proof length of C is much larger than its block length,
this construction has two problems:
1. We are not guaranteed that the proof strings have good
relative distance. That is, it is possible that there are
distinct codewords c1,c 2 ∈ C such that πc1 = πc2.I n
such a case, the codewords c1πc1 and c2πc2 of C
  may
be very close, and so C
  may have a very low relative
distance.2. We are not guaranteed that errors in the proof string
are detected by the veriﬁer. That is, consider the case
where the veriﬁer of C
  is given oracle access to a string
cπ
 ,w h e r ec ∈ C and π
  is very far from πc.I ns u c ha
case, cπ
  may be very far from C
 , but the veriﬁer of C
is not guaranteed to reject cπ
  at all.
The solution to both problems is to use many copies of the
codeword such that their length dominates the length of the
resulting codeword. That is, we deﬁne
C
 (x)=C(x)...C(x)
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
πC(x) (2)
such that   ·|C(x)| 
￿
￿πC(x)
￿
￿. Deﬁning C
  this way ensures
that any harm caused by the proof strings is absorbed by
the codewords. For example, note that even if πc1 = πc2
for some distinct codewords c1,c 2 ∈ C, the corresponding
codewords c1 ...c 1πc1 and c2 ...c 2πc2 of C
  are guaranteed
to be very far, because those codewords diﬀer on a lot of
coordinates in the c1 ...c 1 and c2 ...c 2 part, and this part
dominates the πc1 and πc2 part.
Proof Proof of Theorem 3. Let   =(  2/τ −1)· m/n .
For every c ∈ C, ﬁx some speciﬁc proof string of c and de-
note it by πc. For every message x ∈ F
k, we deﬁne C
 (x)
to be the concatenation of   copies of C(x) and one copy
of πC(x), as in Equation 2. The code C
  has block length
 n + m = O(n + m). Furthermore, C
  has relative distance
of at least (1−τ/2)·δ =Ω ( δ), since for every two messages
x  = y ∈ F
k, each copy of C(x)i nC
 (x)d i ﬀ e r sf r o mt h e
corresponding copy of C(y)i nC
 (y)o nδ-fraction of their
coordinates, and those copies contribute at least (1 − τ/2)-
fraction of the coordinates of C
 (x)a n dC
 (y). It should
also be clear that if C has linear proofs then C
  is linear,
provided that we ﬁxed πC(x) = x · P where P is the proof
matrix of C.
We turn to deﬁne the veriﬁer V
  of C
 .L e tV denote the
veriﬁer of C. When given oracle access to a tested string
w ∈ F
 n+m the veriﬁer V
  views w as composed of   strings
w
1,...,w
  of length n and another string π of length m.
With probability
1
2, the veriﬁer V
  emulates V
w1,π and ac-
cepts if and only if V
w1,π accepts. Otherwise, V
  chooses
i ∈ [n]a n dj ∈ [ ] uniformly at random and accepts if and
only if w
1
i = w
j
i.
The query complexity of C
  is clearly max{q,2}.W es h o w
that V
  rejects strings that are τ-far from C
  with probability
at least
1
8 ·τ ·ε.L e tw ∈ F
 n+m b eas t r i n gt h a ti sτ-far from
C
 ,a n dl e tw
1,...,w
  and π be as in the previous paragraph.
Let c ∈ C be a codeword of C such that δC(w
1)=δ(w
1,c).
Let c
  be the codeword of C
  that consists of   copies of c
and of one copy of πc. We know that w is τ-far from C
  so
in particular δ(w,c
 ) ≥ τ. Since the coordinates of π form
at most τ/2-fraction of all the coordinates of w,t h er e l a t i v e
distance between the concatenation of w
1,...,w
  and the
concatenation of   copies of c must be at least
τ
2.T h i s
implies that Ej∈[ ]
￿
δ(w
j,c)
￿
≥ τ/2.
Suppose that V
  is given oracle access to w.I fδC(w
1) ≥
1
4 ·τ, then the emulation of V
w1,π rejects with probablity at
least
1
4·τ·ε, and therefore V
  rejects with probability at least
1
8 · τ · ε =Ω ( ε), as required. On other hand, suppose that
δC(w
1)=δ(c,w
1) <
1
4 · τ. Then, by the triangle inequality,
it holds that
Ej∈[ ]
￿
δ(w
j,w
1)
￿
≥ Ej∈[ ]
￿
δ(w
j,c)
￿
−Ej∈[ ]
￿
δ(w
1,c)
￿
>
1
4
·τ
and therefore
Pr
i∈[n],j∈[ ]
￿
w
1
i  = w
j
i
￿
>
1
4
· τ
Now, with probability
1
2, the veriﬁer V
  chooses i ∈ [n]a n d
j ∈ [ ] uniformly at random and checks that w
1
i = w
j
i.I t
follows that V
  rejects with probability at least
1
2 ·
1
4 · τ ≥
1
8 · τ · ε, as required.